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Abstract Interest in slurs has partly obscured the issue of pejoratives and connoted 
expressions in general. However, we believe that a deeper understanding of the class the 
slurs belong to will have a positive impact on the study of slurs as well. In this paper, we 
sketch out a classification of the connoted terms, in particular, the pejorative ones. First, 
we analyze the balance between the descriptive and the connotative dimensions of these 
terms in order to find their collocation along a plausible meaning continuum. Then, we 
focus on the connotative component and consider the following criteria by which 
connoted and pejorative terms can be classified: polarity, kind of attitude, conveyed 
level of emotion, and vulgarity. 
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In the last decades, linguists and analytic philosophers of language have dealt with the 
semantic status of slurs, i.e., with those pejorative terms that convey a negative attitude 
toward a set of referents. The intriguing feature of these expressions is that they involve 
an entire target class even though they are directed against only one individual2. The 
interest in this issue has been partly determined by the social and political significance of 
slurs because the use of such expressions seems to involve the speaker‟s adhesion to 
discriminatory practices toward minority groups. For example, the intentional use of 
pejorative terms based on race (i.e., nigger, chink, WOP), sexual orientation (faggot), 
religion (yid, kike), and health status (mongo), etc. is included in the category of hate 
speech, which, in turn, is included in the category of hate crimes. Emblematic in this 
context are the legal responses to verbal discriminatory practices: we simply mention 
                                                          
1 Although this paper results from the collective work of the authors, Maria Paola Tenchini has written in 
particular the Introduction and section 1, Aldo Frigerio sections 2 and 3.  
2 Literature on slurs is vast and often located at the intersection of different disciplines. In Frigerio & 
Tenchini (2014), we have tried to sketch out a map of the main different theoretical positions on the 
semantic status of the derogatory content of slurs. Here, we simply recall some of the studies that have 
contributed most to characterize the research on this issue: Anderson & Lepore (2013a), (2013b) for the 
deflationary/silentist approach; Hom (2008), (2012); Hom & May (2013) for the literalist/truth-
conditional approach; Schlenker (2007), Cepollaro (2015) for the presuppositional approach; Potts (2005), 
(2007); McCready (2010), Whiting (2013), Gutzmann (2015) for the conventional implicature approach. 
RIFL (2019) Vol. 13, n. 1: 78-91 
DOI: 10.4396/09201904 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
79 
here the famous fighting words doctrine drawn up by the US Supreme Court in 1942 in the 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire case3, which recognizes, in the use of insulting and “fighting” 
terms, a limitation to freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
The primary interest in slurs has contributed to „obscure‟ other expressions whose 
semantics is similar to slurs, but, nonetheless, are not slurs4. In various ways and to 
various degrees, these expressions denigrate the target. They include not only insults like 
idiot, asshole, and bastard but also less marked terms, such as cur, jalopy, dump, or 
expressions in their extended meaning, like fascist. 
Further, expressions classifiable as profanity of various kinds (swear words, curse words, 
and the like), such as shit, damn, or fuck (in all its forms and meanings), are to be 
considered5. Such expressions have the primary function of displaying the speaker‟s 
emotional attitude (Oh shit, I’ve lost my keys), and they do not necessarily target an 
addressee or an outgroup. In this sense, these expressions are similar to interjections, 
and, like the latter, can be associated with positive facts (I fucking love cakes). It is evident 
that these expressions are very different from each other.  
The above-mentioned terms are sometimes classified as pejorative, sometimes as 
expressive, or offensive, and, in some cases, as vulgar. These labels are occasionally 
congruent but not always: for instance, there are pejoratives that are not vulgar (cf. 
jalopy) and pejoratives that do not denigrate anyone (cf. oh shit!). What these 
nonhomogeneous terms have in common is that they all conveys an expressive code 
component. This paper aims to propose a classification for them. It is structured as 
follows. In section 1.1, the balance between the truth-conditional denotative and the 
descriptive component of these expressions on the one side and the expressive, 
attitudinal, or emotional connotative component on the other side shall be used as a 
classification criterion. On this basis, in section 1.2, we will see that these expressions 
are distributed over a continuum, from purely descriptive terms (like philosopher) to purely 
expressive ones (damn!), passing through the middle stages (fascist, cur, idler, bastard). In 
section 1.3, we touch upon the neglected distinction between the attribution of negative 
properties and the expression of a negative attitude. We will see that the attribution of 
negative properties is part of the descriptive component of the meaning, which does not 
imply the expression of a negative attitude or an emotional state of the speaker toward 
the target. Furthermore, we will see that, admittedly, the two components are often 
difficult to distinguish in some contexts because negative attitudes naturally arise from 
negative judgments. In section 2.1, the expression of the attitude conveyed by the 
connoted terms will be classified on the grounds of i) polarity, which can be negative, 
                                                          
3  Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) «There are certain well-defined and narrowly 
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting 
or “fighting” words – those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition 
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality» (http://bit.ly/2fSZeX6, last access 
22/11/2018). According to the definition of fighting words by Nowak, Rotunda, and Young (1986) 
quoted by Leets e Giles (1997), such expressions constitute «speech that holds no intellectual content to 
be conveyed to the listener but is merely a provocative emotional message intended and likely to incite an 
immediate, violent response» (Leets & Giles 1997, p. 262).  
4  There are some exceptions such as Potts (2005) and Schlenker (2007), who provide a theory of 
pejoratives and expressive terms in general. However, they do not offer a taxonomy of these terms, which 
is the aim of this paper. 
5 For a survey and a history of this terms, cf. Mohr (2013). 
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neutral, or positive; ii) kind of attitude (contempt, disregard, hate, disgust, anger, 
cursing, etc.); iii) levels of emotion or attitude. In sections 2.2 and 2.3, the dimension of 
vulgarity will be considered and put in relation with the expressive component and 
politeness rules. The offense arising from the use of pejorative terms can be of two 
kinds: i) the offense arising from the use of a pejorative directed toward a person, where 
offense arises from denigration; ii) the offense arising from damage to negative 
politeness, when swear words are used. Section 3 concludes the paper. 
Our proposal will consider the terms that are connoted as expressive or pejorative on 
the basis of their code semantics; therefore, the classification will not take into account 
the appropriated uses of slurs, ironic or sarcastic uses of neutral terms, and the 
(important) role of prosody and coverbal communication. 
 
 
1. Expressive/Descriptive 
The first dimension by which we classify these terms lies in the balance between their 
descriptive, truth-conditional component and their emotional, attitudinal, expressive 
component. The first component concerns the aspects of the meaning, which are 
explored using the traditional truth-conditional semantics: sense and reference, 
intension and extension, Sinn and Bedeutung. What matters here is to specify that, in this 
first meaning component, two aspects are relevant: the set of objects in the world 
denotated by the noun or the verb and the concept associated with that noun or verb. 
We will not take position on how strictly the concept determines the denotation. 
The second basic component of our classification is what we call, for brevity, connotation. 
The connotation of a term refers to emotions, moods, tastes, feelings, and assessments 
displayed by the speaker by means of that very term. In our framework, connotation is not 
a descriptive component but an expressive one, which, accordingly, is independent from 
the truth-conditions assigned to any sentence. This component does not describe states 
of affairs but concerns the attitude of the speaker toward individuals and states of affairs 
and the emotional impact the world has on the speaker6. 
 
1.1 A first classification 
We can classify the terms depending on the preponderance of one component on the 
other. Some terms have a descriptive component but not a connotative one. For 
example, a term like doctor has an extension (the set of doctors) and an intension (the 
complete set of properties included in the concept), but it does not have any 
connotation. This is not though to deny that, in particular contexts, a speaker can use a 
word like doctor with a negative connotation. Let us assume, for example, that Mary has 
had negative experiences with doctors. She generally considers them incompetent and 
unsympathetic. Mary‟s attitude toward doctors is well known within the circle of her 
friends. One day, Mary is talking with a friend about a recent acquaintance and says:  
 
(1) He would be nice, but…he is a doctor. 
 
                                                          
6 Here, connotation is thus intended as the set of semantic values of a word or expression that are 
additional with respect to its intension and extension. For a survey, cf. Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1977) and the 
references within. We presuppose, then, that the semantic value of a word is not exhausted its truth 
conditional contribution but that there can be components of the meaning that do not contribute to truth 
conditions and that are, nevertheless, part of the semantic value of a word. For a similar opinion, cf., for 
instance, Bach (1999). 
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In saying the word doctor, Mary stresses it and slows down the speech rate. She also 
adopts a facial expression conveying disapproval and/or disgust. It is clear that, for this 
particular use of the word, doctor has a negative connotation. Every term can be used like 
that, given the appropriate context. 
Here, however, we are interested in those connotations that are associated to a term at 
the code level, i.e., connotations that a term expresses by default7. Just like a dictionary 
registers the descriptive component, intended as a semantic potential that can be 
modified, reshaped, and pragmatically adjusted in context, the same applies to the 
connotative component. The connotative component that a term has by default can be 
modified and reshaped, like in (1), where a connotative component is added in a 
particular context. Here, we are interested only in the connotation‟s code component 
and not in its pragmatic reshaping in context8. So, for example, doctor has no component 
of this kind by default. 
A second class of terms have both components, descriptive and connotative. For 
example, the word cur has a clear descriptive component (extension, i.e., the set of dogs, 
and intension, i.e., the concept of dog) and a connotative component. The latter 
consists in the expression of the speaker‟s mildly pejorative feeling when using the term 
toward the members of the extension. Slurs belong to this second class as well. A word 
like faggot has an intension and an extension (equivalent to those of homosexual) and a 
connotation consisting in expressing a strong, disparaging feeling toward the target 
referents. 
Lastly, there are terms like damn! or fuck! which have no descriptive component at all9 
but only a connotative component by means of which the speaker expresses the 
                                                          
7 Here, we sharply differ from Lepore & Stone (2018), who claim that connotation is not part of either 
the semantic or the pragmatic meaning. According to them, connotation is something indefinite and 
elusive, something that can vary from speaker to speaker. Thus, connotation cannot be part of the 
meaning one intends to communicate, both semantically and pragmatically, as meaning must be shared by 
participants for communication to be successful. Lepore & Stone (2018) compare connotation (“tone”) 
with the “evocative potential” a poem can generate, thus to something vague and subjective, which 
cannot be considered part of the literal or intended meaning of the poetic text. However, in order to 
support their argument, Lepore & Stone (2018) quote a single example, i.e., the different tone (in the 
Fregean sense) of bloom, flower, and blossom. Indeed, it may be that these terms are synonymous, and that 
the differences among them do not pertain to the meaning because they are something fuzzy and 
subjective. But it is difficult to apply Lepore & Stone (2018)‟s thesis to other highly connoted terms. Lat 
us consider, for example, the difference between very old and decrepit. According to our classification, very 
old is a neutral term, while decrepit is a mixed term, which has, more or less, the same descriptive meaning 
as very old, but which also has a connotation component, by means of which the speaker expresses her 
pejorative evaluation toward something/somebody that is very old. Lepore & Stone (2018) are committed 
to the thesis that this difference is purely subjective and rather variable from speaker to speaker. 
Nonetheless, such a difference is registered in dictionary entries (decrepit is marked by the traits “wasted or 
worn out,” “decayed,” “enfeebled,” and “obsolete,” which always convey a negative evaluation in 
comparison to old), so we are induced to believe that a competent speaker must be aware of the negative 
connotation of a word like decrepit to avoid linguistic mistakes. To relegate connotation to a purely 
subjective phenomenon does not consider that a speaker, by using decrepit, conveys her feelings and 
attitudes toward an object that is very old, and that her addressees will grasp such an attitude (unless the 
context does not reshape the negative connotation in some way). Therefore, we claim that connotation 
cannot be compared to poetical evocations but is part of the meaning of the term (i.e., part of what is 
communicated by its use), although it is not part of the descriptive and truth-conditional meaning. 
8 We believe that as many terms have a code descriptive component that can be reshaped and specified by 
the context, the same can happened to the code connotative component. The context can also add 
descriptive and connotative components to a term or to a sentence. 
9 In reality, these terms originate as descriptive ones, but in the course of its linguistic evolution, this 
descriptive component has faded out. So, damn originates as a legal term meaning “to condemn, declare 
guilty, convict," also in the theological sense of "doom to punishment in a future state” (cf. 
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strength of her emotional state. Thus, the use of such terms is not designed to describe 
how the world is, but to display the speaker‟s emotional state. In this respect, they are 
very close to some interjections.  
This last example allows us to make some clarifications for our analysis. We have said 
that our classification concerns only the code meaning of these expressions and not 
their (potential) contextual meaning. We now note that these terms, as many others, 
may convey more than one code meaning. For example, damn can be used, as we have 
seen, as an interjection to express an aroused emotional state. But this particular 
meaning is only one of the code meanings of damn. The OED registers other meanings: 
“(in Christian belief) be condemned by God to suffer eternal punishment in hell” or 
“Be doomed to misfortune or failure.” When we classify a term as descriptive, mixed, or 
purely expressive, our classification refers to one specific meaning of that term. 
Different meanings of the same term can be included in different classes. This is the 
very case of damn and fuck. 
This clarification, per se quite obvious, allows us to solve complex cases. For example, 
how should a term like fascist be classified? Is it descriptive, mixed, or expressive? We 
think that fascist has at least two meanings. On one hand, it means someone who is 
registered with the Fascist party or who supports or believes in fascism. In this use, it is 
a purely descriptive term. Certainly, it can be used with a negative charge, but this is a 
pragmatic meaning that can be added in contexts where this term is used by antifascist 
people. On the contrary, people who sympathize with that ideology can use this term 
with a positive connotation. In itself, however, this term is neither negative nor positive 
and expresses only that somebody is enrolled in a party (in this, it is similar to communist 
or Republican)10. Nevertheless, fascist has another meaning by means of which “extreme 
authoritarian, oppressive, or intolerant views or people” (OED) are denotated. We 
believe that, in this last meaning, fascist is a mixed term: it denotes authoritarian and 
oppressive people or views or ideas, but it also expresses the very negative judgment of 
the speaker toward such people or ideas.  
 
1.2 A continuum 
It may be legitimately thought from the above that, along the dimension we are 
analyzing, the division is tripartite: purely descriptive, mixed, and purely expressive 
terms. But that is not our opinion. We are of the view, however, that there exists a 
continuum from purely descriptive to purely emotional terms. 
Indeed, some terms have a well-defined descriptive component and only a mild and 
weak connotative component. For example, a term like idler means “who avoids work or 
spends time in an aimless or lazy way.” According to our classification, however, this is 
not the only meaning component, as the term also carries a connotation of a mild 
criticism toward persons of this kind. This component distinguishes idler from lazy, 
since, in lazy, the connotation is even weaker. Other terms come close to the opposite 
extreme of the continuum without reaching it, however. Such terms have an indefinite 
descriptive component and a strong connotation: for example, jerk or bastard. The 
descriptive component of terms like these is very vague. Jerk denotes foolish persons, 
bastard unpleasant and self-centered persons. On the contrary, the connotative 
                                                                                                                                                                    
www.etymonline.com). But in the meaning that we are considering here, such a component has been 
deactivated. 
10 Let us consider, for example, a history book that details the rise to power of Benito Mussolini‟s Fascist 
Party. Evidently, if the authors wish to simply describe the facts objectively without giving any personal 
judgment, they will use fascists as a purely descriptive term. 
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component is marked and strong. Finally, cases such that of slurring terms are located in 
the middle, as their descriptive component is clear-cut and so is their connotation.  
This arrangement explains our intuition on sentences like the following: 
 
(2) Paul is a faggot. 
(3) Paul is a bastard. 
 
(4) Paul is not a faggot. 
(5) Paul is not a bastard. 
 
(6) If there are faggots, I will not come. 
(7) If there are bastards, I will not come. 
 
Both (2) and (3) seem to insult somebody, but while (4) and (6) keep insulting 
homosexuals, (5) and (7) do not seem to insult anybody 11 . Yet, according to our 
classification, both faggot and bastard are mixed terms provided with a descriptive as well 
as a connotative component. So, what does their different behavior in (5) and (7) 
depend upon? The immediate reaction would be to affirm that, while slurs project their 
connotative component 12 , terms like bastard do not 13 . But we do not hold this 
interpretation of the difference between faggot and bastard to be correct14. We also believe 
that sentences (5) and (7) express the speaker‟s negative attitude toward the extension of 
bastard in the same way as (4) and (6) express a negative attitude toward homosexuals, 
i.e., the extension of faggot. Therefore, the connotation of bastard is independent from 
the descriptive component and is projected out of negation and conditionals in the same 
way as the connotation of faggot. It remains to be seen why (5) and (7) seem to insult 
nobody. In our opinion, this is due to two factors, which are probably connected to 
each other: 
 
i. The extension of bastard is very indeterminate because its descriptive component 
is indeterminate.  
ii. The descriptive component of bastard is based on “moral” properties. It is 
difficult to determine who is part of the extension, and everyone can consider 
herself part of the complement of the term‟s extension. On the contrary, the 
                                                          
11 Panzeri and Carrus (2016), in an experimental study, find that pejorative terms like bastard do lose their 
offensiveness when negated, possibly because of a metalinguistic effect that they test in a follow up, but 
they are still perceived as offensive when used in the antecedent of conditionals. This prima facie speaks 
against our intuitions. However, “offensive” is a generic term, which does not clarify what the participants 
to the study have in mind. A pejorative expression such as oh shit!, qua vulgar term, can be said “offensive” 
even though it has no target and does not insult anyone specifically. Cf. section 2.3 on the different 
reasons why an expression can generate offence. 
12 On this slur‟s peculiarity, there is a large amount of literature from Potts (2005). 
13 Another possible explanation is that the connotative component of bastard does not refer to a group of 
people but only to behaviors and actions (cf. Cepollaro 2018: 72). Nonetheless, the expression of a 
negative attitude toward an action should also entail a negative attitude toward the group of people who 
carries it out. Such a group is the term‟s extension. 
14 As we will see in section 2.2, some of the terms we are analyzing are vulgar. Part of their expressivity is 
due to their vulgarity. Further, it is evident that the vulgarity of a term is projected in all contexts. For 
example, if “Paul is an asshole” is vulgar, so, too, are “if Paul is an asshole, I do not want to see him” and 
“Paul is not an asshole”. And if the expressivity of these terms depends on their vulgarity, then it is 
evident that such sentences are vulgar and, hence, expressive. 
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extension of faggot and the other slurs is determined by more “objective” 
properties and, thus, is easily determinable.  
 
As for the first point, it suffices to note that the descriptive features of bastard are very 
vague. It is difficult to respond to the question: “Which properties should one have to 
be a member of the extension of bastard?”. We know that, to be classified as a bastard, 
one must be an unpleasant and self-centered person, but how unpleasant and self-
centered must one be, and what, exactly, unpleasant and self-centered mean is not clear.  
The second point is even more central. The features that define the extensions of 
bastard, jerk, and idler are “moral”, i.e., they concern character, behavior, and intelligence. 
It is difficult to establish whether a person has these properties or not. A person can 
always think not to be unpleasant, foolish, or lazy. It is always questionable whether a 
person has these properties, and it is always possible to deny having them. On the 
contrary, the skin color, nationality, sexual orientation, etc. of a person are not vague 
and are not debatable features.  
By consequence, even though (5) and (7) express a negative attitude toward the persons 
who are unpleasant and self-centered, the identification of these persons is very 
difficult15. Everyone might consider herself not to be part of the extension of bastard 
and, thus, everyone might feel that she is not insulted. Conversely, in (3), the speaker 
states that Paul is part of the extension of bastard and, therefore, predicates the property 
of being an unpleasant and self-centered person of Paul. Furthermore, expressing a very 
negative and aggressive attitude toward these persons, the speaker also expresses this 
attitude toward Paul, given that he is declared as part of the term‟s extension. Paul can, 
then, feel insulted. 
To sum up, words can be arranged on a continuum whose ends are the words lacking a 
connotative component and the words lacking a descriptive component. Slurs are in the 
middle of this continuum because they have both components and they are clearly 
defined. Instead, words such as bastard or jerk have a vague descriptive component, but 
they are strongly connoted because they express a strong attitude of the speaker, so they 
are located close to an extreme, but not at the extreme. Furthermore, many of these 
terms refer to persons‟ moral categories, in contrast to slurs. This accounts for our 
different intuitions on their projectivity, despite their similar semantics. 
 
1.3 Negative description and negative attitude 
To better distinguish the connotation and descriptive components, it is worth 
differentiating the two aspects that are often conflated: the attribution of negative 
features and the expression of a negative attitude. A word‟s connotation is something 
that concerns the speaker‟s moods, feelings, and attitudes. On the contrary, it does not 
concern the attribution of negative features, which is part of the descriptive component 
of the meaning. To clarify this difference, consider the following examples: 
 
(8) This subject scores I.Q. 76. 
(9) The defendant is experiencing a straitened economic situation. 
                                                          
15 An anonymous referee objects that, since the negative attitude towards a whole class does leave no 
trace in sentences such as (5) and (7), the distinction between a descriptive and a connotative component 
is unjustified in the case of these terms. This seems equivalent to deny that bastard has a descriptive 
component altogether and not simply to acknowledge that it is vague. However, uttering a sentence such 
as “I do not like bastards”, the speaker is clearly referring to someone – and this demonstrate that bastard 
has an extension after all – and is clearly expressing a negative attitude towards these people – and this 
demonstrates the presence of a connation. If bastard is a purely expressive term, as the referee seems to 
believe, it is difficult to account for these sentences, in which the use of bastard has no specific target.  
RIFL (2019) Vol. 13, n. 1: 78-91 
DOI: 10.4396/09201904 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
85 
(10) The subject suffers from a chronic mental disorder with abnormal social 
behavior. 
 
Sentences (8)–(10) attribute negative features, such as a lack of intelligence, poverty, 
and/or mental illness, but they are not negatively connoted. Indeed, neutral and 
scientific language is used in these sentences to avoid any negative connotation, i.e., any 
expression of negative attitudes, such as blame, disgust, scorn, etc., for the persons 
described.  
Compare with: 
 
(11)  Paul is an asshole. 
(12)  Paul is a bum. 
(13)  Paul is a weirdo. 
 
Sentences (11)–(13) attribute the same negative features (a lack of intelligence, poverty, 
and/or mental illness), but express the speaker‟s negative attitude. The expression of 
these attitudes does not add further negative features or properties. As we have said, 
connotation does not describe but expresses something16. 
These two aspects are obviously often difficult to distinguish because negative features 
easily raise contempt or disapproval. It is often hard to separate the attribution of 
negative features from the attitudes they generate. However, this distinction is 
mandatory to investigate the semantics of pejoratives and of the connoted words in 
general. It is not sufficient to attribute a negative property to have a pejorative or a 
negatively connoted word. It must also express the negative attitude of the speaker. 
An anonymous referee has noticed a resemblance between our classification and the 
terminology used in meta-ethics about the thick terms17. In this context, it is usual to 
distinguish among descriptive terms, such as red, evaluative terms (called thin terms) such 
as good, and mixed terms (called thick terms), such as courageous and chaste. The latter terms 
are both descriptive and evaluative. We acknowledge that this distinction is analogous to 
ours but we also believe that there are important differences and the referee‟s remark 
gives us the opportunity of better clarifying our position. In particular, we would like to 
distinguish sharply between evaluative and connotative. Evaluations are not yet 
connotations because we can express evaluations in neutral and aseptic terms. Consider 
a teacher who corrects and evaluates the school works of his students: she assigns a 
mark to each school work, suppose excellent, good, fair, poor, etc. In our opinion, the 
teacher is making an evaluation, but the terms she uses are not connoted. She is 
expressing a judgement that is as objective as far as possible, assigning each school work 
to a class along an evaluation scale. She is not expressing an attitude towards the students 
                                                          
16 An anonymous referee objects that negativity is something socially and culturally laden, so there is no 
objective description of negative features. It is a hard question if values are something objective or 
subjective. We personally reject the view that all evaluative sentences are expressions of subjective 
attitudes and we believe in the objectivity of at least some values. For instance, in our opinion neutral 
terms such as “thief”, “murder”, and “rapist” ascribe objective negative features to the persons they are 
predicated of. However, to draw the distinction between description and expression of an attitude we 
need not solve the very complex questions related to the status of values. Scoring I.Q. 76 is a description of 
a state of affairs and it remains a description even though the value of intelligence is a social construction. 
Moreover, if we say that Paul is an asshole, we are expressing a negative attitude toward Paul independently 
of the objectivity or subjectivity of the value of intelligence.  
17 This terminology has been introduced by Williams (1985). The debate on these topics is huge. Cf., for 
instance, Väyrynen (2013). 
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and their school works18. Evaluations have to do with the rational sphere and with the 
analysis, as far as possible, objective of how things are. Rather, connotations have to do 
with the affective sphere of the speakers, i.e. with their emotions, preferences, and 
attitudes. Connotations concern the expression of this sphere. For this reason, we believe 
that evaluative but not connoted terms such as those occurring in (8)-(10) should be 
distinguished by those occurring in (11)-(13). We do not deny that the connotative and 
the evaluative dimensions are often difficult to disentangle and that sometimes they 
even overlap. However, a principle distinction between these dimensions is important 
because they are often collapsed in literature, also in the meta-ethical debate, in which 
sometimes thick terms are compared with slurs. 
 
 
2. The classification of connoted terms 
After differentiating the connotative and descriptive aspects of meaning, we are now 
ready to propose a tentative classification of connoted terms. We have already seen one 
parameter by which connoted terms can be classified: the balance between the 
connotative and descriptive components. In this section, we will examine some further 
dimensions by which connoted terms can be classified. 
 
2.1 Dimensions of connotation 
 We suggest three of these dimensions here: 
1) Polarity. So far, we have considered negatively connoted terms because they are 
more numerous and frequent19. However, positively connoted terms also exist. Take, for 
instance, appellatives such as darling and honey or politeness pronouns in Italian, German, 
or French. There are also connoted terms with a neutral polarity, which are neither 
positively nor negatively connoted but simply express the speaker‟s aroused emotive 
state. The context can clarify whether this state is positive or negative. Cf., for example, 
the word fucking and phrases such as fucking good and fucking bad. In this particular 
meaning, fucking simply expresses the aroused emotive state of the speaker, and the 
word determined by fucking makes it clear whether this state is positive or negative. 
Polarity – positive, negative, or neutral – is, thus, one of the dimensions by which we 
can classify connoted terms.  
2) Kinds of attitude. Connoted terms, in the present view, express the emotions, 
moods, tastes, feelings, and assessments of the speaker. Therefore, the second 
dimension of our classification is the kind of attitude the term expresses, such as 
contempt or disgust against a target (faggot, filthy maggot), curse (go to hell!), fondness for 
someone (darling), anger (Damn!), surprise or amazement (holy shit!), etc. 
3) Levels of emotion or attitude. Attitudes can be more or less strong. For instance, an 
emotion can be faint or intense. Some terms express very strong attitudes, others much 
less intense attitudes. For instance, some slurs are very derogatory, while others are 
weaker, though always negative. Compare, for instance, nigger with Yankee (slur used by 
Mexicans to designate American people). In the same vein, some constructions express 
very contained anger or surprise (oh my dear!); others express much stronger emotions (oh 
holy shit!)20.  
                                                          
18 That the distinction is real is proved by the fact that students often complain that the negative attitude 
of their teachers towards them negatively influence the evaluation of their works. 
19 For the bias in favor of negative terms, cf. Janschewitz (2008). 
20 Dimensions 1 and 3 have been pointed out by Potts (2007). 
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We do not claim that these are the only dimensions by which connoted terms can be 
classified. However, we believe that these three dimensions are among the most 
fundamental. 
 
2.2 Vulgarity 
There is at least a fourth dimension by which connoted terms can be classified: 
vulgarity. As it is clear from the previous examples, many, but not all, connoted terms 
are vulgar. Further, some slurs are vulgar (e.g., bitch, used in this literal meaning to refer 
to women), but not all slurs are, in our opinion (e.g., kike, when used to refer to Jews). 
We devote a whole section to this dimension because it is more elusive and harder to 
define than the others. We will not attempt to give a general definition of what vulgarity 
is here. We simply state that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of vulgarity is to 
refer to sex or defecation and physiological functions in general. This is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition because we can refer to these subjects without being vulgar: e.g., 
we might use scientific terms to refer to the sexual act or to the physiological functions. 
It is difficult to say what the difference between the vulgar term and the corresponding 
scientific term exactly amounts to. They have the same extension and intension and, as a 
matter of fact, it seems that the sole difference is that one is a vulgar and taboo term, 
while the other is a neutral term21.  
Vulgarity, like connotation, tends to project in every context. The negation of a sentence 
containing a vulgar term is still vulgar. Questions and conditionals containing vulgar 
terms are vulgar sentences as well. Even reported speech containing vulgar terms tends 
to be felt as vulgar, so that mass media usually uses abbreviations or the initials of vulgar 
terms when reporting what some person has said.  
The connection between vulgarity and connotation is based on the fact that vulgarity 
intensifies the expressivity of a term. In other words, vulgar terms are usually very 
expressive. Reference to taboo subjects, such as sex or physiological functions, using 
taboo words makes the speaker‟s elocution very emotively loaded. Insults are usually 
considered more aggressive if vulgar (cf. idiot vs. asshole), and expressions of anger or 
surprise are regarded as less intense if they are not vulgar (cf. wow vs. shit!).  
Whatever moral judgment one might formulate about the use of vulgar expressions, 
some scholars have noted that they can have positive functions. For example, they can 
have a cathartic function: by using vulgar terms, speakers can vent intense emotions. 
Moreover, vulgarity can substitute for physical aggression: instead of resorting to a 
violent conflict, the use of vulgar insults allows the speaker to pour out her aggressivity 
toward another person22. Finally, vulgarity can signal informality and proximity. Since 
the use of vulgar words is usually confined to informal, friendly, and domestic contexts, 
to begin to use these terms with another interlocutor can indicate that she is now 
considered a close friend. Paradoxically, the use of vulgar words may be an index of 
positive politeness.  
 
2.3 Offensiveness and impoliteness 
Since pejoratives are sometimes classified as offensive terms, it is important to clarify 
the relationship between pejoration and offensiveness because there is much confusion 
                                                          
21 An anonymous referee of this journal objects that also religion is a typical target of vulgar expressions. 
Maybe they are. However, here it suffices to say that, if blasphemy is vulgar, it is a kind of vulgarity 
different from that we are analyzing here concerning physiological functions. We acknowledge not to 
have a general theory of vulgarity. In fact, as far as we know, there is no such theory in literature, so our 
treatment of this dimension is tentative here.  
22 This is suggested, for instance, by Jay (2009). 
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in literature on this topic. In fact, a connoted term can cause offense and, then, be 
impolite for many reasons. The more obvious motive is that some of these terms 
express the speaker‟s negative attitude toward the addressee or the whole class of 
persons to which the addressee belongs. Negative attitudes, like contempt, disgust, and 
disdain against a person, or a class of persons, warrant offense because they insult 
somebody and make her feel neglected, ostracized, despised, and scorned. The most 
studied case is that of slurs, which express disapproval or contempt toward a class of 
persons. As we have seen, insults, such as asshole or bastard, display the same attitudes 
toward a whole class of persons. However, the limits of this class are so vague and 
indefinite that, when these expressions are predicated of an individual, she can be the 
sole person who feels offended because she is declared a member of the class. The 
individuals who are not explicitly said to be members of the target class can believe they 
are not a part of it. If anything, one might believe that the speaker judges that the class 
contains only one member: the sole individual the expression is predicated of. For these 
reasons, expressions such as asshole or bastard may be considered offensive only for the 
persons explicitly designated by these terms. The reason why slurs and insults can be 
considered offensive is that positive politeness prescribes accepting other persons and 
making them feel appreciated and included in the speaker‟s social circle. These terms 
are, therefore, positive face-threatening. 
However, connoted terms can be offensive for other reasons. First, expressivity by itself 
can generate offense. Brown and Levinson (1987) underline that an excessively 
emotional state can be face-threatening because it gives the addressee reasons to fear the 
speaker or be embarrassed by her. Thus, excessively expressive terms, especially in 
formal contexts, jeopardize the negative face of the addressee. A too violent emotional 
outburst can generate fear because it demonstrates that the speaker is not in full control 
of her emotions and, thus, of her actions. Moreover, it exposes features of the speaker‟s 
psyche that should remain confidential in formal contexts. Therefore, in nonfriendly 
contexts, even expressions of intense joy, pleasure, or sentiment (which are not negative 
attitudes) can be offensive.  
The third reason why connoted expressions can be offensive is their vulgarity. It has 
been shown that the offensiveness of vulgar terms depends heavily on the context and 
the interlocutors. The use of vulgar words among peer college students talking each 
other in an informal setting, such as a dormitory, is considered as a little or not at all 
offensive. The use of the same words in more formal contexts, such a classroom or with 
different interlocutors like professors or the dean, is considered much more offensive23. 
In these cases, referring to taboo subjects and the use of taboo terms to refer to these 
subjects are regarded as inappropriate. 
A concluding note about slurs and their offense potential. According to our 
classification, slurs can offend for the first two reasons: they express a negative attitude 
toward a class of persons, and they express emotionality. If they are vulgar words, the 
third reason can be added to the first two. However, there is a further reason why slurs 
can arouse reactions. The negative attitude toward the target class is not grounded on 
some negative feature of the people belonging to this class, but on some neutral 
property24. Insults against a person can always be judged inappropriate but, nevertheless, 
justified when grounded on a negative feature of the target person (for example, on an 
                                                          
23 Cf. Jay and Janschewitz (2008) and Beers Fägersten (2012). 
24 Of course, racists and homophobic persons believe that a certain color of the skin and a certain sexual 
orientation are negative properties. However, people reacting to the use of slurs think that racists and 
homophobic persons are wrong and that these are neutral features. If values are objective, as we believe, 
these opinions are based on objective facts.  
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improper moral trait or on a blameworthy action). On the contrary, we believe that it is 
morally wrong to despise people for something that is not negative in itself. This 
injustice can engender reactions beyond the three reasons we have listed above. This 
presumably extends to every use of a negatively connoted word when the negative 
attitude is unjustified. 
 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have tried to sketch out a classification of the connoted terms, in 
particular, the pejorative ones. First, we have analyzed the balance between the 
descriptive and the connotative dimensions of these terms in order to find their 
collocation along a plausible meaning continuum. We have then focused on the connotative 
component and considered the following classification criteria: polarity, kind of attitude, 
level of emotion conveyed by such terms, and vulgarity. Our proposal is only a first step 
and, obviously, requires enrichment and development to obtain a more structured and 
fine-grained classification. The interest in slurs has partly obscured the issue of 
connoted expressions in general, but we believe, nonetheless, that a deeper 
understanding of the class the slurs belong to will have a positive impact on the study of 
slurs as well25. 
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